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 Mobility network is crucial for ensuring territorial safety with respect to natural and technological hazards. 
They represent a basic support to community’s everyday life although being exposed elements often 
characterized by high vulnerability to different hazards and, in the meanwhile, strategic equipments for 
emergency management. Physical damages or the lack in functioning of those networks may greatly 
increase the loss of human lives caused by hazardous events as well as produce relevant economic 
damages at medium and long term. Although the relevance of the mobility networks in assuring territorial 
safety is at present largely recognized, risk analyses have been long focused on buildings’ vulnerability or, 
even where they have paid attention to mobility network, they have been mainly focused on the physical 
damages that a given hazard could may induce on individual elements of such network. It is recent the 
awareness that mobility network represents a system, characterized by relevant interdependences both 
among its elements and among network infrastructures and urban systems. Based on these assumptions, 
this paper points out the heterogeneous aspects of the mobility network vulnerability and their relevance in 
increasing the overall territorial or urban vulnerability to hazardous events. Therefore, an in-depth 
investigation of the concept of mobility network vulnerability is provided, in order to highlight the aspects 
mostly investigated and more recent research perspectives. Finally, a case study in the Campania Region is 
presented in order to point out how traditional risk analyses, generally referred to individual hazards, can 
sometimes led to invest in the mobility network improvement or development which, targeted to increase 
the security of a territory result, on the opposite, in an increase of the territorial vulnerability. 
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A key point to explore the relationship between mobility and 
security is the role of mobility network for ensuring territorial safety 
with respect to natural and man-made hazards. For many years, 
increasing the security of settled communities against hazards has 
represented one of the main target of the strategies addressing a 
sustainable urban and territorial development: a community, 
indeed, can be defined as sustainable and resilient when it is 
organized in such a way to minimize the effects of a disaster and to 
assure a fast process of recovery (Tobin 1999). The mobility 
network plays, in this context, a crucial role in that it represents one 
of the basic elements of the wider system of lifelines, which supply 
the communities with essential services for everyday life – on which 
health, comfort and socio-economic welfare depend – allowing in 
the meanwhile an effective response in case of emergency (Paton 
and Johnston 2006). Therefore, mobility network represents, on the 
one hand, exposed elements often characterized by high 
vulnerability levels to different hazardous events and, in the same 
time, strategic equipments both for everyday life of a community 
and for emergency management, being crucial elements to 
guarantee the access and the exodus from the hit areas in the 
immediate post event. Physical damages or failures affecting the 
functioning of mobility network may increase, also significantly, the 
loss of human lives caused by a hazard  as well as induce relevant 
economic damages on medium-long term too.  
Besides, by shifting the attention from the mobility network itself 
toward the relevant flows of people and goods they generally 
support, the impact of a given hazard may even trigger secondary, 
even remarkable, events such as explosions or toxic releases: 
transportation means carrying dangerous substances or hazardous 
plants placed along the network should be directly affected by the 
hazard itself or by its consequences on the network. 
Although the relevance of the mobility network in assuring territorial 
safety is nowadays largely recognized, risk analyses have been long 
focused on physical vulnerability of building stock; even when more 
attention has been paid to road infrastructures, physical damages 
that a given event may induce on individual elements have been 
mainly investigated.  
It is still quite recent the awareness that mobility network 
represents a system, characterized by relevant interdependences: 
either because each element of the network is linked to all the 
others, or because there are several interdependences not only 
among the different typologies of network infrastructures, but also 
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among network infrastructures and urban systems. Road and 
railway networks, for example, should be not directly damaged by a 
hazard, but suffer indirect damages due to the direct ones affecting 
other network infrastructures, such as the electric or the sewerage 
ones. In the same way, inside urban areas, road and railway 
networks could suffer functional damages due to obstructions 
caused by the partial or total collapse of buildings. Starting from the 
above assumptions and grounding on several past disasters, in the 
following pages, the numerous facets of mobility network 
vulnerability and their influence on the vulnerability of a territorial or 
an urban system to hazardous events will be analyzed. Therefore, 
an in-depth review of the concept of vulnerability in relation to 
mobility network will be provided, in order to point out the most 
investigated aspects up to now. Finally, the last part of the paper 
will be focused on a case study in the Campania Region aimed at 
pointing out how traditional risk analyses, usually based on single 
hazardous events, can led to invest into the improvement and 
adjustment of mobility network which, targeted to increase the 
security of a territory result, on the contrary, in an increase of the 
territorial vulnerability. The case study is part of a wider study 
developed by the authors within the Italian Research Project (PRIN) 
2006-2008 entitled “Early Warning Systems: technical, urban 
planning and communication aspects”. 
 
 
Hazardous events and mobility network: which impacts? 
 
The impacts of natural and technological hazards on mobility 
network are numerous and include not only direct physical damages 
to networks themselves, but also indirect or secondary damages 
such as loss of accessibility to hit areas, often with dramatic 
consequences on the rescue operations and/or economic damages 
at local and regional scale over long temporal span. 
The most common damages, and the most investigated ones in 
current literature too, are the physical ones caused by different 
natural and, to a lesser extent, technological hazards: in particular  
physical damages caused by earthquakes, landslides and floods on 
road and railway networks.  
Earthquakes may affect road networks in several ways. Very often a 
hit road, although damaged, still performs its purpose: in many 
cases, after an earthquake minor cracks appear on the road 
surface; such minor damages do not directly affect the road 
functioning but may induce faster degradation phenomena of the 
road quality over time, as highlighted by the Hokkaido Tocachi-Oki 
earthquake occurred in 2003. Nevertheless, very frequently physical 
damages to the road networks are so relevant that they severely 
affect also the functionality of the roads. Such damages, often due 
to the ground shaking or to site effects, produce a total loss in road 
functioning, because of the physical damage to the road itself or, in 
some cases, to the collapse of critical elements of the network such 
as bridges, viaducts, tunnels. The Japanese and North-American 
earthquakes provide relevant examples of those types of damages. 
The Hokkaido Toho-Oki Earthquake occurred in 1994 caused 
relevant damages to road infrastructures, with relevant cracks due 
to local liquefaction phenomena; the Kobe earthquake in 1995 
severely affected the road network, by dividing the road surface into 
big plates and causing the collapse of important road axes (Tung 
2004). 
Besides, it should be considered that road infrastructures often play 
a crucial role in the wider mobility system: the interruption of a road 
can have repercussions on the overall mobility system at both local 
and regional scale producing, sometimes, relevant consequences 
also in terms of loss of human lives. 
The total or partial collapse of viaducts and bridges represents one 
of the most typical damage due to seismic events as highlighted by 
several past events: during the Northridge earthquake in California 
occurred in 1994, 6 bridges collapsed and 157 elements among 
bridges and viaducts were seriously damaged; the Loma Prieta 
earthquake in 1989 caused relevant damages to more than 80 road 
infrastructures; the earthquake occurred in Alaska in 1964 caused 
the collapse of the Cooper River Highway; the San Ferdinando 
earthquake in California in 1951 caused the partial destruction of 
the bridges on the Golden State Freeway2. 
Losses in functioning of the road networks might also occur without 
relevant physical damages to the roads themselves, as a 
consequence of secondary events triggered by the earthquake or 
due to the obstruction of the road by debris materials. Sometimes, 
damages to mobility network may be due to secondary hazard, such 
as landslides induced by earthquakes, floods caused by breaks in 
not seismic-resistant dykes and embankments, fires or technological 
accidents. The obstruction of the roads due to triggered landslides 
are very frequent in mountain areas outside urban centers, whereas 
in the urban centers, mainly in the historical areas, one of the main 
problem to deal with during the emergency phase is the obstruction 
of numerous roads due to building collapses. 
In the first case, the induced landslides, although not causing 
relevant damages to the road, can determine loss of functioning 
which can be quickly restored, as it occurred after the Miyagiken-
Hokubu earthquake in Japan in 2003. 
Roads interrupted by building debris are very frequent in urban 
areas: in these cases, damages to the road surface might be light, 
but consequences in terms of accessibility or efficacy of rescue 
activities might be very relevant. Several examples of such types of 
damages have been recorded in past earthquakes, even not severe 
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ones, which hit historic urban areas characterized by a compact 
morphology. This kind of urban settlements is very common in 
Italian cities but also in numerous other Mediterranean areas, such 
as Greece, or east areas such as Japan and Taiwan. Hence, relevant 
obstructions along the road networks due to building total or partial 
collapses have been largely recorded during the earthquake which 
has recently hit the Abruzzo Region in Italy, or in other events, such 
as the one occurred in 1997 in the Umbria and Marche Regions or 
the ones which hit Friuli (1976) and Irpinia (1980).  
Apart from earthquakes, landslides, volcanic phenomena such as 
lava and pyroclastic flows, other hazardous phenomena, such as 
tsunami, hurricanes or floods may induce relevant direct damages 
to the road network too. Such phenomena may cause physical 
damages to the road surfaces or induce obstructions which interrupt 
the links among different territorial areas and require relevant 
interventions to restore road functionality. During the 2008 flood in 
Piemonte, for example, relevant damages and interruptions of road 
networks occurred, also with the collapse of bridges and supporting 
walls caused by lateral erosions and mud and debris flows 
(Provincia di Torino 2008).  
Many examples of different types of damages which may affect road 
networks in case of hazardous events are provided by the Katrina 
hurricane. The latter represents an emblematic case for showing 
how chains of events, being apparently “improbable”, can be more 
frequent than it could be thought: from a “large aircraft fuel tank 
transported by storm surge to freeway roadside”, to boats “dragged 
inland by storm surge until finally colliding with Interstate Highway 
Bridge”, with the consequent closure of road for repairing the bridge 
that “sustained many similar collisions along its span” (Wyndham 
Partners 2005). When rail networks are involved, the damages 
caused by hazardous events are very similar to those described for 
the road networks, with the addition of the likely running off of the 
trains conveying hazardous substances. That is what happened in 
the dramatic accident occurred in 2009 in Viareggio (Italy), where a 
freight train carrying GPL went off the rails very close to the railway 
station, in a densely built up area where numerous buildings were 
located along the railroad: the explosion of the GPL spilt out the 
tank wagon provoked 20 dead, 50 injured people and the collapse 
of two buildings close to the station. Furthermore, there was the 
need for evacuating other buildings damaged by the explosion and 
consequent fire. Generally speaking, as concerns technological 
accident, it is possible to distinguish those occurring along the 
mobility network, because of the transport of hazardous materials, 
and those that, occurring in hazardous plants located nearby 
mobility network, hit elements of the networks themselves. In 
relation to the first typology of events, it is possible to remind, apart 
from the above-mentioned Viareggio disaster, the accident occurred 
in San Carlos de la Rapita (Spain), in 1978, where a fireball due to 
the overfilling of a tanker carrying 22 tons of propylene, provoked 
200 dead in a camping, or that occurred in Houston in 1976, when a 
tanker carrying 19 tons of ammonia fell from a height of 10m. 
producing a toxic cloud which killed 6 people. In Italy it can be 
mentioned the event of Capannori, occurred along the Firenze-Mare 
Highway in 1982 where 4 people died and 2 were injured because 
of a pile-up caused by fog3 or the disaster of Casalguidi in 19854 in 
which 2 people died and 4 people were seriously injured. 
Among the most well-known technological accidents occurred along 
railway networks, the one occurred in San Luis Potosi (Mexico) in 
1981 – when a train went off the rails into an urban area causing 
the break of a rail tank carrying 100 tons of chlorine which, in turn, 
provoked a toxic cloud which killed 20 people – and the one 
occurred in Georgia (USA) in 1959 – when the break of a rail tank 
carrying 18 tons of GPL as a consequence of a derailment caused an 
explosion in a pic-nic area killing 23 people – can be mentioned. 
There are also several examples of disasters caused by sea 
transports, like the one occurred in Bantry Bay (Ireland) in 1979, 
when a French oil tanker burnt during the unloading, causing the 
explosion of an oil terminal, in which 50 people died. 
Roads and railways are not the only targets of hazardous events. 
Also the damages to port infrastructure and navigable channels due 
to seismic events are relevant, even though less investigated. Not 
surprisingly, the several damages to port infrastructures caused by 
the Kobe (1995) and the Tokachi-Oki (2003) earthquakes in Japan 
and the Lefkada earthquake (1999) in Greece have led to work out 
technical advices and guidelines for port seismic safety. 
Other relevant seismic targets are the airports; in detail, whereas 
the main airport structures are generally built up according to high 
safety standards, some vulnerable elements are often located within 
the airports, such as  control towers or fuel tanks. Other natural 
phenomena have also affected air mobility: it is worth mentioning, 
for example, the consequences of the 1944 Vesuvius’ eruption, 
which produced damages and delays to the Anglo-American air 
forces or, more recently, the closure of important Sicilian airports 
due to the Etna eruptions in 2001 and 2007.  
As already said, even if there are no important physical damages, 
losses in functioning of the road networks may occur, causing a 
reduction in the accessibility to some areas with consequent delays 
in rescue operations and relevant difficulties in emergency 
management. The Katrina hurricane showed that also in case of 
floods, the main problem is the evacuation of population both in 
alert phase – before the occurrence of the phenomenon – and in 
post event phase, when the mobility network is seriously damaged 
or completely interrupted or where, as in New Orleans, most of 
people depend on public transport. In New Orleans, indeed, the 
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evacuation plan was largely based on private cars, whereas 
“hundreds of thousands of residents were unable to evacuate 
because they lacked transportation” (Litman 2006). Also in case of 
earthquakes, the lack of accessibility causes relevant failures, mostly 
when the hazardous event involves big urban centres, like the 
earthquake occurred in 1980 in the Campania Region (Galderisi and 
Ceudech 2005).  
Physical and functional damages suffered by the mobility network 
may also induce relevant socio-economic medium and long term 
consequences, involving both the block of the travels from the 
working places to residential areas and the freight flows to and from 
the hit area. Moreover, when the network infrastructures link distant 
places crossing the area hit by a hazardous event, the 
consequences of the disaster might reverberate on areas very far 
from the disaster core, with social and economic consequences too  
(systemic damages). These types of consequences have been 
largely stressed in relation to some disasters: in Kobe earthquake, 
the damages to port infrastructures, mainly due to the liquefaction 
of the soil, had big repercussions on the national and international 
trade (Kajitani et al. 2000). Also the Midwest flood in 1993 
highlighted the relevance of economic damages caused by the block 
of port activities (Tierney et al. 1996): 5000 river cargo ships were 
hit and the cost of the delay in the freight traffic was estimated in 
several million dollars per day. An in-depth study on the economic 
impacts of the Northridge earthquake (Tierney 1997) has shown the 
importance of medium and long term damages to the economic 
activities and the central role that the interruption of transport 
networks can play (Gordon et al. 1998). 
 
 
Analyzing networks vulnerability: approaches and methods 
 
Methods and techniques addressed at analyzing vulnerability of 
mobility networks have been mainly developed in the field of 
seismic hazard studies. Furthermore, many European research 
projects aimed at deepening network infrastructures vulnerability 
(Risk-UE, LessLoss) have been mostly focused on earthquakes too. 
Nevertheless, starting from the Nineties, the investigation field has 
been progressively widened not only in relation to the typology of 
the considered hazards, but also in relation to the types of 
vulnerability which are taken into account.  
In respect to the first of the two mentioned points, first of all it is 
worth underlining that in the mid-Nineties, in Australia, USA and 
New Zeeland, the methodologies used to analyze lifelines 
vulnerability to earthquakes were applied to investigate vulnerability 
toward other hazard factors, such as wind storms, floods and 
tsunami. In Europe, among the recent projects based on a multi-risk 
approach, the following should be mentioned: the ESPON project – 
which, although dealing with exposure and vulnerability of mobility 
network, did not provide any indicators to evaluate them – and the 
Armonia project – which, grounding on the knowledge-base already 
available in scientific literature, pointed out some vulnerability 
indicators, both on regional and local scale, with reference both to 
the physical vulnerability of mobility infrastructures and to the 
crucial role they play in the capacity of settled communities to cope 
with hazardous events (copying capacity) (Galderisi and Menoni 
2007). Moreover, even the research studies focused on individual 
hazard factors are more and more taking into account the impacts 
caused by the likely chains of hazardous events that can issue from 
a triggering event. An interesting study on vulnerability of transport 
systems to seismic events in the USA central area, questioning 
about the typologies of impacts that such events may cause on 
infrastructures, takes into account not only those directly produced 
by the earthquake, but also those due to all likely − natural and 
technological − hazards that the earthquake might cause (such as 
landslides or toxic releases) (Central U.S. Earthquake Consortium 
2000). In respect to the second point, related to the shift of the 
research focus from physical to other typologies of vulnerability, the 
widening of the investigation field can be attributed to several 
factors. The first one is undoubtedly related to the widespread 
awareness that vulnerability analyses have a crucial role in the 
knowledge of the risk features of a given area.  
 
 
 
Fig.1  - The widening of vulnerability concept has largely influenced 
method and techniques for vulnerability analysis, shifting the focus 
from physical toward functional and systemic damages. 
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Fig.2  - The acknowledgement of the interdependences among 
network infrastructures has driven several scholars to focus on the 
multiple cascade effects that the impact of a hazard on each 
element may trigger on all the others. 
 
In the current international literature, it is nowadays widely 
acknowledged that the measurement of vulnerability features is a 
key step toward an effective prevention and mitigation of natural 
and technological risks (Birkmann 2006).  
The second factor is mainly related to the widening of the 
vulnerability concept itself, largely due to the relevant changes in 
scientific paradigms in the field of vulnerability and risk analysis too 
which started in the Seventies. In detail, vulnerability analysis, 
traditionally focused on the knowledge of the vulnerability features 
of individual exposed elements (buildings, roads, etc.), grounding 
on a systemic approach, have moved their focus toward the 
relationships among the elements and mainly toward the behaviors 
of complex systems in face of hazardous events.  
Although the numerous and heterogeneous meanings of 
vulnerability in scientific literature, it is largely shared the idea that 
vulnerability of an urban or a territorial system to a given hazard is 
something more than the sum of the vulnerability of all their 
elements. Finally, a further factor can be identified in the growing 
importance of mobility network in current socio-economic context, 
characterized by economic macro-regions where interdependences 
among cities or economic activities are due, more than to spatial 
contiguity, to the presence of relevant material and immaterial 
communication networks (Sassen 2001).  
Thus, mobility network – apart from being itself a system 
characterized by relevant interdependences among its elements – 
represents the basic support to those relationships. Therefore, it can 
be described as a network of different networks (road network, rail 
network, etc.): each network is constituted by linked elements and 
is characterized by mutual interdependences with all the others. 
Hence, in case of hazardous event, damages to the road network 
might cause, as above mentioned, a loss of accessibility to elements 
of other networks, such as railway stations, airport, with relevant 
consequences, for example, on the distribution of first aids in the 
immediate post-event. Besides, mobility network represents the 
basic support of people, goods, freight flows both inside a given 
territorial context and between it and the outside. Hence, the 
impact of a hazardous event on the elements of the mobility 
network at local scale (railway stations, airports, ports, highways, 
etc.) might reverberate on a global scale too, according to the level 
of “centrality” of the hit area in the wider regional, national or global 
context. Those assumptions point out the complexity of the spatial 
dimension of vulnerability: such an aspect has been largely 
emphasized in the European Project “Scenario” that, grounding on 
qualitative-quantitative scenarios of events, impacts and damages, 
has explored the “systemic” component of vulnerability, often 
neglected in the traditional risk analyses, because of its difficult 
quantification and modeling. As highlighted in the mentioned 
Project, systemic vulnerability has to be referred to the 
interrelationships, or better the interdependences, among elements 
or systems even located very far one from  the other, which may 
influence their capacity to adequately perform their purposes. The 
concept of “systemic vulnerability” has been crucial for the 
improvement of the networks vulnerability analyses: the awareness 
of the interdependences among the networks, and between them 
and the territorial systems they belong to, leads to move the 
investigation field toward concepts and topics different from 
physical vulnerability. At present, great attention is devoted either 
to the interdependences between mobility network and the other 
network infrastructures (electric power, gas, etc.) or, mostly in 
urban areas, between network infrastructures and the overall urban 
tissue. Due to the broadening of the vulnerability concept, new 
investigation categories and, accordingly, new methods have come 
out. Besides the most traditional analyses on physical vulnerability 
of individual elements of each network, vulnerability analyses are 
currently mainly focused on the interdependences and cascade 
effects between the different elements of mobility network, the 
elements of different network infrastructures (Moselhi et al. 2005; 
Paton and Johnston 2006; O’Rourke 2007; Tang and Wen 2009) 
and between mobility network and urban areas they cross (Goreti 
and Sarli 2006).  
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Very often, indeed, the reduced functionality of road network in the 
emergency phase is due more to indirect damages (total or partial 
collapses of buildings and consequent obstructions of the roads) 
than to direct damages to the network itself (Hazus 1997).  
Furthermore, damages to road network, apart from representing a 
damage per se, may cause losses of accessibility to other strategic 
equipments in the emergency phase (hospitals, barracks, etc.) or 
may isolate some urban areas from others. The strong emphasis on 
interdependences inside the network infrastructures and among 
them and territorial contexts has driven to assign a key role, in 
vulnerability analysis, to the concept of redundancy, interpreted as 
the availability of different components within a systems playing the 
same role so that, in case of damages to one component, the others 
can continue to perform their purposes (Berdica 2002, Bruneau et 
al. 2003). Thus, if an element of the road network which guarantees 
the access to strategic equipments in emergency is damaged, the 
availability of alternative links or, in other words,  the replaceability 
of such an element is crucial. In this case, although a direct damage 
to a single element occurs, relevant consequences, such as the 
potential loss of human lives due to the lack of accessibility to 
hospital services, can be avoided.  
It is worth noting that although the concept of redundancy is very 
useful to analyze road or railway network vulnerability in face of 
localized hazardous events, it is less effective when relevant nodes 
of mobility network (such as airports or ports) or widespread 
hazards affecting numerous elements of the mobility network are at 
stake: “a serious snow storm may”, for example, “disable all 
alternative routes in a large area” (Berdica 2002).  
Finally, other relevant concepts that, issuing from transportation 
field, are more and more frequently applied in network 
infrastructures vulnerability analysis are those concerning 
“serviceability” and “reliability” (Berdica 2000, Jenelius 2009) of 
such networks. In detail, if vulnerability of an element or a network 
generally refers to the propensity of such element or network to be 
damaged, in the case of network infrastructures, and especially of 
mobility network, such a damage has to be mainly referred to the 
loss of usability (“serviceability”) of individual elements or of the 
whole network in a given time span, which can also depend on 
obstructions of network elements that, although not being strictly as 
a physical damage, yet compromise the use. 
In a similar way, the concept of “reliability” refers to the regular 
functioning of  mobility network in a given time span. In case of 
hazardous event, such a regular functioning can be compromised, 
also without any physical damage to the network, because of 
congestion phenomena, for example, which can depend on several 
factors: such as network features, type of facilities served by the 
network, people and activities’ density in the crossed areas  (etc.). 
 
 
Fig.3  - The case-study area within the Siano Municipality in the 
Campania Region. The area is characterized by a slope potentially 
affected by mudflows at whose base an LPG plant is located. 
 
Finally, the growing importance of the resilience concept in the 
disaster field open the floor to new research perspectives. Despite 
the several meanings of the word resilience, according to different 
disciplinary fields, in the disaster field, it can be defined as “the 
capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to 
hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and 
maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure” (UN/ISDR 
2004). From the above assumptions, it clearly issues that the 
resistance of mobility infrastructure, or its more or less quick 
recovery to functionality in the post event phase, greatly affects the 
overall capacity of a community to cope with a calamitous event 
(O’Rourke 2007).  
In particular, some scholars have suggested quantitative 
approaches to assess the resilience of network infrastructures, 
essentially based on the loss of quality/functionality of those 
systems and on the time necessary for their recovery (Bruneau et 
al. 2003). 
 
 
Mobility network vulnerability and territorial safety: the 
case of Siano in Campania Region 
 
Based on the above-said assumptions on mobility network 
vulnerability to natural and technological hazards, this paragraph 
focuses on the inadequacy of traditional vulnerability and risk 
analyses, highlighting through a case-study, how such analyses – 
usually referred to individual hazards neglecting both the likely 
synergies among different typologies of hazardous events and the 
likely chains of impacts and damages that those synergies can 
trigger – can often lead to investments on mobility network which, 
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originally targeted to improve territorial safety, result on the 
contrary in an increase of the overall vulnerability.  
In detail, the case-study is the Municipality of Siano in the Campania 
Region: the area is periodically affected by relevant hydro geological 
phenomena; it is classified as seismic zone 2 by the Decree 
3274/2003 and it is included in the yellow zone of the Vesuvius 
National Emergency Plan. Actually, the municipality of Siano, 
together with Sarno and Bracigliano, was severely hit by the multi-
site mudflow occurred in May 1998: the phenomena affected 
different hill slopes, running over the settlements and causing 160 
victims. After those events, warning systems linked to the 
monitoring of rainfall levels and the attainment of critical thresholds 
have been set up. Furthermore, numerous measures aimed at 
preventing future events and mitigating their impacts have been 
implemented. Those measures can be divided into four groups: 
structural mitigation measures on the hill slopes, recovery of the 
building stock, recovery of the hit facilities, recovery and 
improvement of network infrastructures and, mainly, of the lifelines.  
As the last group of measures is concerned, a main road has been 
built in the Siano Municipality in order to facilitate the exodus from 
the built-up area of Siano, escaping the built-up area of the 
surrounding Municipality of Castel San Giorgio. Such a road has 
been built on a previous route and it is located out of the “red 
zone”, namely the area characterized by the highest hazard levels, 
according to the Decree 4816 of the Government Commission for 
Hydro Geological Emergency in Campania Region.  
Therefore, since the strategic role of the road in case of emergency, 
the location of the road has been correctly defined according to an 
individual hazard factors, the hydro-geological one. Nevertheless, 
very close to the lifeline, a Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) plant is 
located. The latter, according to the law in force (art.8, D. Lgs. 
334/99) is classified as a plant with major potential for the quantity 
and the quality of handled substances. That plant covers an overall 
area of 6,690 sqm which, apart from a small area in the Castel San 
Giorgio Municipality, is mostly included in the Municipality of Siano. 
It is placed at the base of one of the slopes potentially affected by 
mudflows and is part of the “red zone” and, specifically, it is 
included in the sector A, where the above-said Decree, because of 
its high hazard levels, laid down strict rules for civil protection 
management and rigid limitations for future land uses.  
At present, The Municipality of Siano is provided with an 
Interprovincial Emergency Plan – which, approved by the Decree 
2586 issued in 2002, lays down the procedures  for the warning, 
evacuating and safety sheltering the population in the risky areas – 
and with the Municipal Plan for Landslide Emergency, updated in 
2007. Besides, in June 2006, the Prefecture of Salerno has worked 
out the Emergency External Plan for the LPG plant. 
It should be noticed, that the likely trigger of a technological 
accident due to a mudflow has not been mentioned neither in the 
Interprovincial Plan nor in the Municipal one, both dealing only with 
landslides. Moreover, it is worth even noting that, following the 
current national legislation, the Emergency External Plan for the LPG 
plant defines the most probable major accident scenarios only in 
relation to “ordinary” conditions. Hence, it does not take into 
account mudflows as a likely triggering factor for technological 
accidents. The case study has been deepened within the Italian 
Research Project (PRIN) 2006-2008 entitled “Early Warning 
Systems: technical, urban planning and communication aspects” . 
In detail the research work, focused on an area placed inside the 
Municipality of Siano which includes one of the slopes potentially 
affected by mudflows phenomena and the LPG plant, was 
addressed at setting up a comprehensive scenario of hazardous 
events, impacts and damages. In detail, the likely chains of natural 
hazardous events (mudflows) and technological accidents (due to 
the impact of a mudflow on the plant itself) and the consequences 
of such coupled events on the area surrounding the plant have been 
analysed5. Although it can be assumed that the examined chains of 
natural and technological (na-tech) events have a low probability of 
occurrence, there are numerous studies showing the constant 
growth, in number and severity, of coupled or chained na-tech 
events in the last decades. By referring to the above-considered 
case-study, the scenario techniques have been applied to grasp the 
dynamic features of hazardous events over time, the complex 
network of relationships between the damages suffered by some 
elements and the trigger of likely further hazards, the mutual 
influences between physical and functional damages, etc.  
 
 
 
Fig.4 - Based on a 3D data animation in GIS environment a 
comprehensive scenario of hazards, impacts and damages has 
been developed. 
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Nevertheless, the difficulties in carrying out comprehensive 
scenarios are numerous, especially in the case of coupled natural 
and technological hazards: not only the description of such complex 
chains of events, impacts and damages requires indeed 
heterogeneous competences, but the scarce availability of data 
related to past events, which the necessary back-analyses should be 
based on, increases the uncertainties in defining the numerous and 
heterogeneous types of likely damages.  
In order to outline the comprehensive scenario, first of all a likely 
hazardous event has been defined: grounding on in-depth geo-
environmental investigations, the potential triggering points of the 
likely mudflows have been identified on the considered slope. 
Moreover, according to the slope morphology and features, two 
typologies of likely mudflows have been singled out: the first one 
occurring on a plane slope; the second one that could be canalized 
into the gulley dominating the LPG plant.  
Furthermore, the temporal span which the scenario is referred to 
has been chosen, starting from the triggering of the mudflow to the 
first emergency phase. 
Due to the relevant dependence of the mudflows’ trigger and 
evolution on the morphological characteristics of the slopes, a 3D 
model of the site can be very useful to better understand the 
dynamic evolution of the phenomenon at stake, according to the 
local peculiarities (scarps, gullies, and so forth).  
Moreover, the physical damages due to the investigated phenomena 
largely depend, apart from the hazard features, on the features of 
the exposed settlements.  
Therefore, a 3D model both for site and settlement has been 
developed into a GIS environment, which has been arranged to 
support the different steps of the comprehensive scenario: from the 
trigger of mudflows up to the different impacts and damages due 
the hazardous event.   
In detail, the GIS includes different data-bases related to numerous 
themes, such as site morphology, buildings, population, activities 
and so forth. Based on these data-bases, the 3D model of site and 
settlement has been created.  
Furthermore, the model represents also the preventative structural 
measures built up after the 1998 disaster along the investigated 
slope (e.g. drainage channels, check dams, etc.). Then, the building 
up of a 3D data animation in GIS environment allowed us to provide 
a simulation of the dynamic evolution of the mudflows starting from 
the selected triggering points, identifying the affected area, the 
involved territorial targets and the main impacts and damages due 
to the mudflows.  
In detail, the scenario dynamic simulation shows, according to the 
features of the exposed targets, the likely physical damages (to 
buildings and infrastructures), the consequent  damages to people, 
the potential functional and systemic damages (loss of accessibility 
to emergency facilities, unemployment due to the temporary block 
of industries, and so on).  
Besides, since among the exposed targets the LPG plant is included, 
physical damages to the plant as a consequence of the mudflow 
and the likely accident scenarios, which those damages might 
induce, have been identified. In detail, due to the physical damages 
to the plant, an immediate release of LPG (in a quantity which might 
vary from 200 to 600 cubic meters according to the number of the 
involved tanks) warehoused in the tanks located just below the hill 
slope. That release can produce, because of the specific 
morphological conditions of the site, a gas concentration until 
reaching the inflammability threshold: when that threshold is 
reached, any triggering factor may cause the explosion, involving 
the area surrounding the plant in which residential buildings, other 
industries and, above all, the main escape route within the 
municipal territory are located.  
The explosion would cause not only the temporary lack of road 
serviceability but, more seriously, since such an event represents an 
un-expected one in the present emergency planning, it should 
greatly increase the damages produced by the triggering natural 
hazard – the mudflows – by hitting flows of people and emergency 
vehicles passing along the road.  
As already mentioned, in fact, mudflows are a typical example of 
likely multi-site event, which could start firstly along one slope, 
bringing into action the emergency procedures, and then hit that 
one dominating the LPG plant. 
 
 
 
Fig.5  - The likely accident scenario due to the impact of the 
mudflow on the LPG plant might involve a wide area, in which not 
only residential buildings and other industrial activities but even the 
main escaping road  in case of emergency are located. 
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Therefore, this study aims at highlighting that – since the 
improbability of chained events is only apparent, as the numerous 
examples mentioned above largely show – in order to support 
effective prevention and mitigation measures and mainly to improve 
the efficacy of the emergency management, it should very useful to 
combine traditional risk analyses with comprehensive scenarios of 
events, impacts and damages. They represent, indeed, an essential 
support for a better understanding and communication of the likely 
dynamic evolutions and the synergies among different hazard 
factors and of the complex chains of consequences that each factor 
and their coupled effects may induce in a given time span and in a 
given area. 
Those scenarios can be expressed both through quantitative and 
qualitative data: the latter, generally related to functional damages 
not easily quantifiable (e.g. congestion phenomena along roads) 
should not be undervalued. In many cases the description of such 
failures or troubles may help to avoid “crises”, mostly in terms of 
emergency management, which generally depend on the occurrence 
of unexpected or beyond the expected events. 
 
Notes 
 
1 Even though this paper is based on a common research work, the 
first, the third and the fourth paragraphs have been edited by 
Adriana Galderisi; the second paragraph has been edited by 
Andrea Ceudech. 
2  Total damage was estimated in 100 million dollars. 
3 In the pile-up a tanker was involved too: a fire caused a BLEVE 
from the petrol tank of the motor followed by a firewall, while a 
jet fire 10 meters long came out of the broken tank. 
4  The disaster was caused by a tanker which ran into a building. 
The collision induced the break of a  valve from which GPL come 
out and vaporized inside the building causing an explosion. 
5  The scenario was carried out by a multidisciplinary research group 
constituted, apart from the authors, by the prof. Franco Ortolani, 
for the geological aspects, and by the prof. Davide Manca for the 
likely industrial accident scenarios due to the mudflow. 
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